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Abstract
We provide conditions for which the round functions of an `-bit Rijndael-like block cipher generate the alternating group on
the set {0, 1}`. These conditions show that the class of Rijndael-like ciphers whose round functions generate the alternating group
on their message space is large, and includes both the actual Rijndael and the block cipher used by the compression function
of the WHIRLPOOL hash function. The result indicates that there is no trapdoor design for a Rijndael-like cipher based on the
imprimitivity of the group action of its proper round functions which is difficult to detect.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cryptography; Permutation groups; Block ciphers; Rijndael; Hash functions
1. Introduction
An SP network is an iterated block cipher in which each round realizes Shannon’s principle of confusion and
diffusion [29] by the use of substitutions and permutations, respectively. A widely-used class of SP networks is defined
by invertible confusion and diffusion layers, followed by the XOR-operation of the round key with the state. Here the
confusion layer is a parallel application of nonlinear substitutions to the subblocks of the state, while the diffusion layer
is a linear transformation of the entire state. An important example of such an SP network is the Rijndael block cipher
[8,9], which is defined for various block bit sizes `b and key bit lengths `k , where `b, `k ∈ {128, 160, 192, 224, 256}.
The versions for the block size of 128 bit and key length of 128, 192, and 256 bits were adopted by the NIST as
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [24]. Rijndael is designed to have the maximum known immunity against
differential cryptanalysis [3] and linear cryptanalysis [18] (see [26]). Since the end of the AES selection process
much research has focused on the structural and algebraic aspects of Rijndael, which includes the analysis of several
alternative representations of the AES as well as some group theoretic investigations of the AES components (see,
e.g., [2,6,11,17,21,32]). The exploration of the structural properties of a block cipher can yield new insights, which
may provide the foundation for a further cryptanalysis of the cipher. In the case of the AES, algebraic relations and
simple algebraic representations of the cipher have been found [11,21] which might provide useful starting points for
further cryptanalytic work.
In this paper we provide several new results on group theoretic properties of Rijndael-like ciphers with applications
to some important block ciphers. For several block ciphers, including the DES [22] and AES, results on the group
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theoretic properties of their components have already been found (see, e.g., [10,17,30–32]). A first motivation for
the investigation of the group theoretic structure of a block cipher is to exclude undesirable properties, such as short
cycles or non-trivial factor groups for the group generated by the round functions of the cipher. For example, it was
shown in [27] that if the group generated by the round functions of a block cipher acts imprimitively on the state
space, then there is an exploitable weakness in the cipher. Moreover, it is possible to give examples of DES-like
block ciphers, which have a trapdoor with respect to this property, but nevertheless possess a certain resistance against
classical linear and differential cryptanalysis (see [27]). A further motivation to study the group theoretic properties
of a block cipher stems from a connection to the Markov cipher approach to classical differential cryptanalysis [16,
25]. If it can be shown that the round functions of a block cipher generate the alternating group on the message space,
then for all corresponding Markov ciphers the chain of differences is irreducible and aperiodic, which means that
after sufficiently many rounds of the cipher all differences become equally probable [12]. As the AES round functions
generate the alternating group on the state space [32], after sufficiently many AES rounds all differences will roughly
be equally probable with respect to the Markov cipher theory approach (see also [1, Section 3.2]).
However, as shown in [20], it is not sufficient for a block cipher to be practically strong if the group generated by
the round functions of the cipher is large. This corresponds to our results found in this paper for the class of Rijndael-
like SP networks (cf. Remark 2 and Theorems 3 and 4). Furthermore, as pointed out in [7], for a given set of round
functions which generates a large permutation group on the message space, it might be possible to approximate this
set by another set of round functions which generates only a small permutation group on the message space.
Our results show that the class of Rijndael-like ciphers whose round functions generate the alternating group on
their message space is large and includes both the actual Rijndael and the block cipher used by the compression
function of the WHIRLPOOL hash function [13]. This indicates that for Rijndael-like ciphers there is no trapdoor
design based on the imprimitivity of the group action of its proper round functions which is difficult to detect.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some notions and facts from the theory of permutation
groups which are used in this paper. In Section 3 we prove some properties of groups generated by the round functions
of a Rijndael-like SP network, which we call SP functions in this paper. Furthermore, we provide conditions for the
substitution and the linear diffusion layer of SP functions such that the group generated by those functions is equal to
the alternating group on the state space. In Section 4 we first define our model for a Rijndael-like block cipher, which
is intended to have sufficient generality to comprise most ciphers being similar to the actual Rijndael. Then we derive
conditions for Rijndael-like round functions such that the group generated by these functions is equal to the alternating
group on the state space. In Section 5 we apply the results obtained in the preceding sections to the actual Rijndael
block cipher [9] and show that the round functions of Rijndael for every block size of 32 · n bits, n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8},
generate the alternating group on the set {0, 1}32n . Here we also study some consequences of this result for the security
of Rijndael. In Section 6 we show that the round functions of the block cipher used by the compression function of
the WHIRLPOOL hash function [13] generate the alternating group on the set {0, 1}512. Furthermore, we study the
impact of this result for the security goals of WHIRLPOOL, like preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and
collision resistance. In Section 7 we conclude the paper.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
The finite field of cardinality q is denoted by G F(q) and the set of all m × n-matrices over G F(q) is denoted
by Mm,n(G F(q)), where we write Mn(G F(q)) instead of Mn,n(G F(q)). Elements of G F(q)mn are identified with
matrices b ∈ Mm,n(G F(q)) via the mapping ι : G F(q)mn → Mm,n(G F(q)), a 7→ b, defined by bi j = ani+ j , for
all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n. For any b ∈ Mm,n(G F(q)), we write wH (b) for the Hamming weight of b, which is
defined as the number of non-zero entries of b. We write ( f ◦ g)(x) = f (g(x)) for compositions of functions f, g.
The cardinality of a set X is denoted by |X |.
2.2. Group theoretical background
In this section we present some background from the theory of permutation groups which is used in this paper.
For any nonempty finite set X , the group of all bijective mappings of X to itself is denoted by SX and is called the
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symmetric group on X . If n > 0 is a natural number and X = {1, . . . , n}, we write Sn instead of SX . Any subgroup
of SX is called a permutation group on X . Let `, n denote natural numbers such that 0 < ` ≤ n. A permutation group
G ≤ Sn is called `-transitive if, for any pair of `-tuples (a1, . . . , a`) and (b1, . . . , b`) with ai 6= a j , bi 6= b j for
i 6= j , there is a permutation g ∈ G with g(ai ) = bi for i = 1, . . . , `. A 1-transitive permutation group is said to be
transitive. If G is a permutation group on a set X and a ∈ X , the subgroup of all g ∈ G such that g(a) = a is denoted
by Ga .
For multiple transitivity the following proposition holds (cf. [33]).
Proposition 1. Let G be a transitive permutation group on a finite set X, 0 < ` < |X | a natural number, and a ∈ X.
Then G is (`+ 1)-transitive on X if and only if Ga is `-transitive on X \ {a}.
Let G ≤ SX be a permutation group with |X | = n. A subset B ⊆ X is called a block of G if g(B) = B or
g(B) ∩ B = ∅ for every g ∈ G. A block B ⊆ X is said to be trivial if B ∈ {X,∅} or B = {x} where x ∈ X . A
complete non-trivial block system for G is a partition {X1, . . . , X t } of X into disjunctive subsets X i of equal size s
with 1 < s < n, such that for every permutation g ∈ G and every block X i there is a block X j with g(X i ) = X j for
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Let G ≤ SX be transitive. G is called imprimitive if there is a non-trivial block B ⊆ X of G. Otherwise, G is
said to be primitive. For every imprimitive permutation group G there is a complete non-trivial block system for G
(cf. [33, Section 7] for some results on imprimitive permutation groups).
For any nonempty subset U of a permutation group G we write 〈U 〉 for the subgroup generated by U . The cyclic
order of an element g ∈ G is the cardinality of the cyclic subgroup generated by g, i.e., the least integer n > 0 such
that gn(x) = x for all x ∈ X . A permutation g : X → X is a transposition if g interchanges two elements x, y ∈ X
and fixes all the other elements of X \ {x, y}. A permutation g is called even if g can be represented by an even
number of transpositions. The set of all even permutations g ∈ Sn forms a group which is called the alternating group
on {1, . . . , n}, and which is denoted by An . The degree of a permutation group G over a finite set X is defined as the
number of elements of X that are moved by at least one permutation of G. The degree of a permutation is defined
as the degree of the cyclic group generated by this permutation. The minimal degree of a permutation group G is the
smallest degree of the non-identity permutations of G.
We use the following facts stated in [33,31] which provide sufficient conditions for a permutation group to be the
alternating or symmetric group.
Theorem 1 ([31], Thm. 1). Let G be a transitive permutation group on a finite set M with |M | > 7. If there is an
element g ∈ G which contains in its cycle representation a cycle of prime number length p with |M |/2 < p < |M |−2,
then G is the alternating or the symmetric group on M.
Theorem 2 ([33], Thm. 15.1). Let G be an `-transitive permutation group which is neither alternating nor symmetric.




Further information on the theory of permutation groups can be found in the textbooks [28,33].
3. Groups generated by SP functions
In this section we show properties of groups generated by the round functions of a Rijndael-like SP network, which
we call SP functions in this paper. In [4] conditions have been provided such that the group generated by SP functions
is primitive. The purpose of this section is to provide simple conditions for the substitution and the linear diffusion
layer of SP functions such that the group generated by those functions is equal to the alternating group on the message
space.
Definition 1. Let m, n, r > 0 be natural numbers. A mapping ρ[k] : Mm,n(G F(2r ))→ Mm,n(G F(2r )) is called an
SP function if ρ[k] has the form σ [k] ◦ λ ◦ γ , where γ , λ, σ [k] : Mm,n(G F(2r )) → Mm,n(G F(2r )) are functions
with the following properties:
(i) γ is the parallel application of m · n single bijective S-box-mappings γi j : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ) defined by
γ (a) = b if and only if bi j = γi j (ai j ) for all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n.
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(ii) λ is an invertible linear transformation over Mm,n(G F(2r )) ∼= G F(2r )mn , i.e., there is an invertible matrix
D ∈ Mm·n(G F(2r )) such that λ(a) = D · a for all a ∈ G F(2r )mn considered as column vectors.
(iii) σ [k] is the XOR-operation with a key k ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) defined by σ [k](a) = b if and only if bi j = ai j ⊕ ki j
for all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n.
Definition 2. Let γ, λ be the fixed functions operating on the state space Mm,n(G F(2r )) as defined above. Every set
of SP functions of the form S P(γ, λ) = {σ [k] ◦ λ ◦ γ : k ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r ))} is called a complete set of SP functions
of size (m, n, r).
Note that properties of any key scheduling algorithm are not taken into account in the preceding definition. For
every complete set of SP functions S = S P(γ, λ), the group generated by S is denoted by GS .
Proposition 2. For any complete set of SP functions S = S P(γ, λ) of size (m, n, r), the group GS is transitive on
Mm,n(G F(2r )).
Proof. For any x, x ′ ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) choose k, k′ ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) such that k ⊕ k′ = x ⊕ x ′. Then for
ρ[k], ρ[k′] ∈ S it follows that ρ[k] ◦ ρ[k′]−1(x) = σ [k ⊕ k′](x) = x ′. 
Proposition 3. Let S = S P(γ, λ) be a complete set of SP functions of size (m, n, r) such that m · n ≥ 2 and r ≥ 2.
Then GS contains only even permutations.
Proof. By applying the fact that a permutation over a set with an even number of elements is even if and only if its
cycle representation contains an even number of cycles, it can easily be shown that the component functions γ , λ, and
σ [k] are even permutations (cf. [32]). 
Definition 3. Let G be a permutation group on the set Mm,n(G F(2r )). We say that G has property P if for all
m × n-tuples of even permutations Pi j : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ), 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n, the mapping
f : Mm,n(G F(2r )) → Mm,n(G F(2r )), x 7→ y, defined by yi j = Pi j (xi j ) for all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n, is an
element of G.
Lemma 1. Let S be a complete set of SP functions of size (m, n, r) such that m · n ≥ 2 and r ≥ 4. Then GS is equal
to the alternating group on the set Mm,n(G F(2r )) if and only if GS is 2-transitive and has property P .
Proof. If GS is equal to the alternating group on Mm,n(G F(2r )), then clearly GS is 2-transitive and has property P .
For the converse, let ψ : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ) denote a permutation, where the cycle representation of ψ contains a
3-cycle and 2r − 3 fixed points, and let ψ ′ : Mm,n(G F(2r ))→ Mm,n(G F(2r )), x 7→ y, be defined as y00 = ψ(x00)
and yi j = xi j for all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n, with (i, j) 6= (0, 0). By assumption, the permutation ψ ′ is an element of
GS , and the degree of ψ ′ is equal to 3·2q−r , where q = m ·n ·r . Suppose that GS is strictly smaller than the alternating
group on the set Mm,n(G F(2r )). As GS is 2-transitive, it follows by Theorem 2 that for the minimal degree dmin of
GS we have dmin ≥ (2q − 2q/2+1)/3. Since r ≥ 4 and q ≥ 8, it follows that dmin ≤ 3 · 2q−r < (2q − 2q/2+1)/3,
which is a contradiction. Thus, because GS contains only even permutations, we have shown that GS must be equal
to the alternating group on the set Mm,n(G F(2r )). 
Definition 4. For every bijective mapping α : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ) and every pair (k, k′) ∈ G F(2r )2 let fα[k, k′] :
G F(2r )→ G F(2r ) denote the mapping defined by fα[k, k′](x) = α−1(k ⊕ α(k′ ⊕ x)) for all x ∈ G F(2r ).
Proposition 4. Let S = S P(γ, λ) be a complete set of SP functions of size (m, n, r)with r ≥ 3. Suppose for every pair
of integers (u, v), 0 ≤ u < m, 0 ≤ v < n, there are an integer t > 0 and key pairs (k1, k′1), . . . , (kt , k′t ) ∈ G F(2r )2
such that the mapping fγuv [k1, k′1] ◦ · · · ◦ fγuv [kt , k′t ] has a cycle of prime number length p with 2r−1 < p < 2r − 2.
Then the group GS has property P .
Proof. For any k ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) let ρ[k] = σ [k] ◦ λ ◦ γ and let (u, v) denote a fixed pair of integers with
0 ≤ u < m, 0 ≤ v < n. Furthermore, let K1uv denote the set of all subkey pairs (k, k′) such that ki j = k′i j for all
(i, j) ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} × {0, . . . , n − 1} \ (u, v), and let
K2uv = { (λ(k), λ(k′)) : (k, k′) ∈ K1uv }.
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Then every permutation of the form ρ[k] ◦ ρ[k′]−1, (k, k′) ∈ K1uv , or ρ[k]−1 ◦ ρ[k′], (k, k′) ∈ K2uv , only changes the
(u, v)th entry of an element from Mm,n(G F(2r )). Then
Guv = 〈{ρ[k] ◦ ρ[k′]−1 : (k, k′) ∈ K1uv} ∪ {ρ[k]−1 ◦ ρ[k′] : (k, k′) ∈ K2uv}〉
is a subgroup of GS which acts only on the (u, v)th entry and will therefore be considered as a permutation
group on the set G F(2r ). As Guv is generated by all permutations over G F(2r ) of the form x → k ⊕ x and
x → γ−1uv (k ⊕ γuv(x)), Guv is transitive on the set G F(2r ) and contains only even permutations on G F(2r ). For
every i ∈ {1, . . . , t} define keys
ki1, ki2, ki3, ki4 ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r ))
such that ki1 and ki3 are the zero elements of Mm,n(G F(2r )), the (u, v)th entry of ki2 is equal to k′i , the (u, v)th
entry of λ−1(ki4) is equal to ki , and all the other m · n − 1 entries of ki2 and ki4 are equal to zero. Then for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, the mapping
ρ[ki1]−1 ◦ ρ[ki2] ◦ ρ[ki3] ◦ ρ[ki4]−1,
is equal to the function fγuv [ki , k′i ] on the (u, v)th component. By assumption, the function
(ρ[k11]−1 ◦ ρ[k12] ◦ ρ[k13] ◦ ρ[k14]−1) ◦ · · · ◦ (ρ[kt1]−1 ◦ ρ[kt2] ◦ ρ[kt3] ◦ ρ[kt4]−1)
is an element of Guv which has a cycle of prime number length p with 2r−1 < p < 2r − 2. Therefore, the subgroup
Guv is equal to the alternating group on the set G F(2r ) by Theorem 1. Thus, every permutation of Mm,n(G F(2r ))
which is defined as a parallel application of even permutations Pi j : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ), 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n,
where each Pi j operates on the (i, j)th entry of Mm,n(G F(2r )), can be generated by a composition of elements of
subgroups Gi j , which proves the result. 
Remark 1. The assumption in the preceding proposition does not hold if the bijective mapping γuv : G F(2r ) →
G F(2r ) has a differential characteristic [3] or a linear approximation [18] with probability 1. Simulations indicate
that for randomly chosen bijective mappings γuv on G F(28), the assumption of Proposition 4 is satisfied with high
probability.
Remark 2. The bijective mapping γuv : G F(28)→ G F(28) defined by
(00x 6dx )(01x 5fx )(02x 61x )(03x 62x )(04x 71x )(05x 78x )(06x 72x )(7fx 80x )
has 240 fixed points, but nevertheless it can be shown that γuv satisfies the assumption of Proposition 4.
Theorem 3. Let S = S P(γ, λ) be a complete set of SP functions of size (m, n, r) such that m · n ≥ 2 and r ≥ 4.
Suppose that the following conditions hold:
(i) GS has property P .
(ii) For every state a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) with 0 < wH (a) < m · n there is a permutation f on Mm,n(G F(2r )) such
that λ ◦ f ∈ (GS)0 and wH (a) < wH ((λ ◦ f )(a)).
Then GS is equal to the alternating group on Mm,n(G F(2r )).
Proof. According to Lemma 1, it suffices to show that GS is 2-transitive on Mm,n(G F(2r )). By Proposition 2, the
group GS is transitive on Mm,n(G F(2r )). Hence it suffices to show that the subgroup (GS)0 of GS containing all
elements of GS which leave the zero element of Mm,n(G F(2r )) fixed, is transitive on Mm,n(G F(2r )) \ {0} (cf.
Proposition 1). Let a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) denote a state such that 0 < wH (a) < m ·n. By assumption there is an integer
t < m · n and permutations f1, . . . , ft on the set Mm,n(G F(2r )) such that
g = ((λ ◦ ft ) ◦ · · · ◦ (λ ◦ f1)) ∈ (GS)0
and all entries of the state g(a) ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) are non-zero. Then g(a) can further be transformed by a parallel
application of even permutations on G F(2r ), which leave the zero element of G F(2r ) fixed, to the matrix in
Mm,n(G F(2r )) whose entries are all equal to the identity element 1 of G F(2r ). Therefore, (GS)0 is transitive on
the set Mm,n(G F(2r )) \ {0} and the result follows. 
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4. Properties of Rijndael-like ciphers
In this section we define a model of a Rijndael-like cipher, which has sufficient generality to include most ciphers
being similar to the actual Rijndael block cipher. We further provide conditions for the substitution and diffusion layer
of Rijndael-like round functions such that the group generated by the corresponding complete set of Rijndael-like
functions is equal to the alternating group on the state space.
Definition 5. Let m, n, r > 0 denote natural numbers and let ρ[k] = σ [k]◦λ◦γ be an SP function on Mm,n(G F(2r ))
(see Definition 1).
(a) ρ[k] is called a Rijndael-like function if there are functions pi , θ on Mm,n(G F(2r )) such that λ = θ ◦ pi and the
following hold:
(i) pi is a shift-rows-like mapping, i.e., there is a mapping c : {0, . . . ,m − 1} → {0, . . . , n − 1} with 0 ∈ im(c)
such that pi(a) = b if and only if bi j = ai,( j−c(i))mod n for all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n.
(ii) θ is a mix-columns-like mapping, i.e., there is an invertible diffusion matrix D ∈ Mm(G F(2r )) such that
θ(a) = D · a for all a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )).
(b) ρ[k] is called a dual Rijndael-like function if there are functions pi ′, θ ′ on Mm,n(G F(2r )) such that λ = θ ′ ◦ pi ′
and the following hold:
(i) pi ′ is a shift-columns-like mapping, i.e., there is a mapping c′ : {0, . . . , n − 1} → {0, . . . ,m − 1} with
0 ∈ im(c′) such that pi ′(a) = b if and only if bi j = a(i−c′( j))mod m, j for all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n.
(ii) θ ′ is a mix-rows-like mapping, i.e., there is an invertible diffusion matrix D′ ∈ Mn(G F(2r )) such that
θ ′(a) = a · D′ for all a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )).
Definition 6. (a) Any block cipher which uses for its encryption a composition of (dual) Rijndael-like functions is
called a (dual) Rijndael-like cipher.
(b) Let γ, pi, θ (γ, pi ′, θ ′, respectively) denote a fixed set of functions operating on the state space Mm,n(G F(2r )) as
defined above. Any set of (dual) Rijndael-like functions of the form R(γ, pi, θ) = {σ [k]◦θ◦pi◦γ : k ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r ))}
(or R(γ, pi ′, θ ′) = {σ [k]◦θ ′◦pi ′◦γ : k ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r ))}, respectively) is called a complete set of (dual) Rijndael-like
functions of size (m, n, r).
E. Barkan and E. Biham provided a general definition of duality for ciphers in [2]. Notice that every dual Rijndael-
like cipher (or dual Rijndael-like function) as defined here is also a dual cipher of a corresponding Rijndael-like cipher
in the sense of [2].
Example 1. (a) The usual round functions of the AES consisting of the composition of the SubBytes, ShiftRows,
MixColumns and AddRoundKey step defined in [24] are Rijndael-like functions with m = n = 4, r = 8. Hence the
AES (as well as the actual Rijndael [9]) is a Rijndael-like cipher where the first AddRoundKey step and the last round,
which omits the MixColumns step, are considered as special Rijndael-like functions.
(b) The round functions of the W block cipher, which is used in the compression function of the WHIRLPOOL hash
function [13], are examples of dual Rijndael-like functions with m = n = r = 8, and the W block cipher is a dual
Rijndael-like cipher.
(c) The small scale variants of the AES considered in [5] are examples of Rijndael-like ciphers (see also [6, pp.
43–45]).
(d) The round functions of the KHAZAD block cipher [23], which has been submitted to the NESSIE evaluation
process [23], are dual Rijndael-like functions with m = 1 and n = r = 8 in which the mapping c′ defined for the
shift-columns-like function pi ′ maps all arguments to 0.
For every complete set of (dual) Rijndael-like functions R, the group generated by R is denoted by G R .
Lemma 2. Let R = R(γ, pi, θ) be a complete set of Rijndael-like functions of size (m, n, r) such that r ≥ 2 and
G R has property P . Let b = (b0, . . . , bm−1) ∈ G F(2r )m denote a vector all of whose entries are non-zero. Then for
every non-zero element a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) there is a permutation Ba : Mm,n(G F(2r ))→ Mm,n(G F(2r )) with the
following properties:
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(i) Ba is a parallel application of permutations Pi j : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ), such that Pi j (ai j ) = bi for ai j 6= 0 and
Pi j (0) = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < m and 0 ≤ j < n.
(ii) The permutation θ ◦ pi ◦ Ba is an element of (G R)0.
Proof. By definition, the function γ is the parallel application of m · n single S-box-mappings γi j : G F(2r ) →
G F(2r ), 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n. If γi j is an even (odd) permutation, choose an even (odd) permutation
Pi j : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ), such that Pi j (ai j ) = bi for ai j 6= 0 and Pi j (0) = 0, for all 0 ≤ i < m and 0 ≤ j < n.
Define Ba : Mm,n(G F(2r )) → Mm,n(G F(2r )) as the parallel application of the m · n single mappings Pi j , for
0 ≤ i < m and 0 ≤ j < n. Then there is a function γ ′ defined as the parallel application of m · n even permutations
γ ′i j : G F(2r )→ G F(2r ), 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n, such that Ba = γ ◦ γ ′. As γ ′ and θ ◦ pi ◦ γ are elements of G R , it
follows that θ ◦ pi ◦ Ba is an element of (G R)0. 
Similarly, we obtain the following corresponding result.
Lemma 3. Let R = R(γ, pi ′, θ ′) be a complete set of dual Rijndael-like functions of size (m, n, r) such that r ≥ 2
and G R has property P . Let b = (b0, . . . , bn−1) ∈ G F(2r )n denote a vector all of whose entries are non-zero. Then
for every non-zero element a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) there is a permutation Ba : Mm,n(G F(2r )) → Mm,n(G F(2r )) with
the following properties:
(i) Ba is a parallel application of permutations Pi j : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ), such that Pi j (ai j ) = b j for ai j 6= 0 and
Pi j (0) = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < m and 0 ≤ j < n.
(ii) The permutation θ ′ ◦ pi ′ ◦ Ba is an element of (G R)0.
Definition 7. For integers n, r > 0, let ∆(n, r) denote the set of diagonal matrices δ ∈ Mn(G F(2r )) such that
δi i ∈ {0, 1} for 0 ≤ i < n.
Theorem 4. Let R = R(γ, pi, θ) (R = R(γ, pi ′, θ ′), respectively) be a complete set of (dual) Rijndael-like functions
of size (m, n, r) such that r ≥ 4 and m ≥ 2 (n ≥ 2). Furthermore, let c (c′) denote the function defined in pi (pi ′)
according to Definition 5 and let D ∈ Mm(G F(2r )) (D′ ∈ Mn(G F(2r ))) denote the invertible diffusion matrix of the
mapping θ (θ ′). Suppose that the following conditions hold:
(i) G R has property P .
(ii) If m, n ≥ 2, then 1 ∈ im(c) (1 ∈ im(c′)).
(iii) There is a vector b ∈ G F(2r )m (b′ ∈ G F(2r )n , respectively) such that for all non-zero matrices δ ∈ ∆(m, r)
(δ′ ∈ ∆(n, r)) every entry of the vector D · δ · b (b′ · δ′ · D′) is non-zero.
Then G R is equal to the alternating group on Mm,n(G F(2r )).
Proof. We prove the result for a complete set R = R(γ, pi ′, θ ′) of dual Rijndael-like functions, the assertion for the
standard case can be shown similarly. For every matrix a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) and every row index k with 0 ≤ k < m,
let
δ(a, k)
denote the diagonal matrix δ ∈ Mn(G F(2r )) such that δi i = 1 if aki 6= 0, and δi i = 0 if aki = 0, for 0 ≤ i < n. For
every non-zero element a ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) let Ba denote a mapping
Ba : Mm,n(G F(2r ))→ Mm,n(G F(2r ))
defined as the parallel application of permutations Pi j : G F(2r ) → G F(2r ), with Pi j (ai j ) = b′j for ai j 6= 0
and Pi j (0) = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < m, 0 ≤ j < n, such that the permutation θ ′ ◦ pi ′ ◦ Ba is an element of (G R)0
(because G R has property P and r ≥ 2, such a mapping Ba exists for every non-zero a by the preceding lemma). Let
u ∈ Mm,n(G F(2r )) denote a state such that 0 < wH (u) < m · n and let u′ = pi ′(Bu(u)). As the kth row of the state
θ ′(pi ′(Bu(u))) is equal to
b′ · δ′(u′, k) · D′
for 0 ≤ k < m, the application of the mappings pi ′ and θ ′ to the state Bu(u) results in a matrix v with at least one row
all of whose entries are non-zero. If m = 1, then wH (u) < wH (v) and the assertion follows by Theorem 3. If m > 1,
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we have 0, 1 ∈ im(c′), and the further application of pi ′ to the state Bv(v) implies that at least two rows of the matrix
pi ′(Bv(v)) must contain at least one non-zero entry. Then
w = (θ ′ ◦ pi ′ ◦ Bv) ◦ (θ ′ ◦ pi ′ ◦ Bu) (u)
must be a state with at least two rows containing no zero-entries. Thus, we have shown that after finitely many
applications of permutations of the form (θ ′◦pi ′◦Bz) ∈ (G R)0 to the state u, we obtain a state s withwH (u) < wH (s).
Hence the result follows by Theorem 3. 
Remark 3. Let n ∈ {1, . . . , 8} and let D∗ ∈ Mn(G F(28)) be any matrix where all entries of D∗ are randomly
chosen from the set G F(28) \ {0}. Experiments on a computer demonstrate that with high probability there is a vector
b ∈ G F(28)n such that condition (iii) of the preceding theorem is satisfied.
5. Application to the Rijndael block cipher
In this section we apply the results obtained in the preceding sections to the actual Rijndael block cipher [9] and
show that the round functions of Rijndael for every block size of 32 n bits, n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, generate the alternating
group on the set M4,n(G F(28)). An actual Rijndael round function on the state M4,n(G F(28)) is a mapping of the
form ρR[k] = σ [k] ◦ θR ◦ piR ◦ γR with round key k ∈ M4,n(G F(28)), where γR, piR, θR, σ [k] denote the SubBytes,
ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey step, respectively, as defined in [9, Section 3.4]. For n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
let
G R,n = 〈{ρR[k] : M4,n(G F(28))→ M4,n(G F(28)), k ∈ M4,n(G F(28))}〉
denote the group generated by the set of actual Rijndael round functions on the state M4,n(G F(28)). Properties of
the Rijndael key scheduling algorithm are neglected here. Note also that the entire Rijndael encryption function starts
with an AddRoundKey step and omits the MixColumns step in the last round.
Theorem 5. For every n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, the group G R,n generated by the actual Rijndael round functions is equal
to the alternating group on M4,n(G F(28)).
Proof. We will show the result by Theorem 4. Let SR : G F(28) → G F(28) denote the S-box mapping defined for
Rijndael (cf. [9, Section 3.4.1]). The function fSR [14x , 19x ] ◦ fSR [7dx , 93x ] on G F(28) has the cycle (00x , . . . , ecx )
of prime number length p = 229. Hence the group G R,n has property P by Proposition 4. Let cR,n : {0, 1, 2, 3} →
{0, . . . , n − 1} denote the function that defines the cyclical shifts of rows in the piR step of Rijndael. By [9,
Section 3.4.2] we have 1 ∈ im(cR,n) for every n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Furthermore, let DR ∈ M4(G F(28)) denote the
invertible matrix in the MixColumns step θR of Rijndael. The vector b = ( 7dx , 9ax , 10x , cdx )t satisfies the property
that for all non-zero matrices δ ∈ ∆(4, 8), all entries of the vector DR ·δ ·b are non-zero. Thus it follows by Theorem 4
that G R,n is the alternating group on the set M4,n(G F(28)). 
By the preceding result, several possible regularities such as the existence of non-trivial factor groups or a too small
diversity of occurring permutations can be excluded for Rijndael. If the generated group G R,n were smaller than the
alternating group on the set M4,n(G F(28)), several undesirable properties for G R,n were possible which could be
exploited for cryptanalysis.
Small cardinality. If the cardinality of the group G R,n were small, then this property may be related to regularities of
Markov chains that are considered in the context of differential and linear cryptanalysis (see [25] and [12]). If these
chains are not irreducible or not aperiodic, then differential and/or linear attacks may be derived. In particular, the
following two special cases for the property of small cardinality could arise. If the cardinality of the group G R,n were
smaller than the cardinality of the key space, then key search can be simplified (see [14]). If the group G R,n were
isomorphic to some subgroup of the affine group AGL(4 · n, 28), then computations for key search or plaintext search
may efficiently be performed.
Imprimitivity. If the group G R,n were transitive but imprimitive, there is a complete non-trivial block system for G R,n ,
i.e., a partition {X1, . . . , X t } of the message space into disjunctive subsets X i of equal size s with 1 < s < 232n , such
that for every permutation g ∈ G R,n and every block X i there is a block X j with g(X i ) = X j for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Then for every g ∈ G R,n there is a permutation g¯ on the set {1, . . . , t} such that g(X i ) = X g¯(i) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
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Hence for any given ciphertext c, the subset X j with g−1(c) ∈ X j can be determined after t chosen plaintexts.
Then, for a given ciphertext, any search for the right plaintext can be reduced to particular subsets of size 232n/t .
This approach can be further extended by using more than one complete non-trivial block system for the group G R,n
(see [27, 3.3]). Furthermore, if the permutation g¯ is determined by only a part of the session key information, a
divide-and-conquer attack on the entire session key is possible (cf. [27, 3.2]).
Intransitivity. If the group G R,n were intransitive, then for a given ciphertext conclusions about the corresponding
plaintext can be possible, because the plaintext must belong to the same orbit. Therefore, if the membership of an
element to an orbit can be efficiently computed, a plaintext search could be significantly accelerated. This approach
can further be generalized to the case where the group G R,n is not `-transitive (` > 1), because, for `-tuples of
pairwise different ciphertexts, the corresponding `-tuples of plaintext must belong to the same orbit (see [15, pp. 230
ff.]).
6. Application to the WHIRLPOOL hash function
WHIRLPOOL [13] is a 512-bit hash function designed by P. Barreto and V. Rijmen, which does not belong to
the MD4-family (see [19, Ch. 9]). The compression function of WHIRLPOOL is defined by the Miyaguchi–Preneel
scheme (cf. [19, 9.43]) whose security is related to an internally applied block cipher named W . A first version of
WHIRLPOOL was submitted to the NESSIE project [23] and an updated version was accepted for the NESSIE portfolio
of cryptographic primitives. The final version of WHIRLPOOL (further updated with an optimized diffusion layer) was
adopted by the International Organization for Standardization in the ISO/IEC 10118-3 standard [13].
The W block cipher is an example of a dual Rijndael-like cipher over the state space M8(G F(28)). The finite field
G F(28) is represented here as G F(2)[x]/(p8(x))with p8(x) = x8+x4+x3+x2+1. A W round function is a mapping
of the form ρW [k] = σ [k] ◦ θW ◦ piW ◦ γW with round key k ∈ M8(G F(28)), where σ [k] denotes the XOR-operation
of k on M8(G F(28)) and γW , piW , θW are the following component functions. The function γW : M8(G F(28)) →
M8(G F(28)) is defined as the parallel application of the S-box mapping SW : G F(28)→ G F(28), x 7→ SW [x] on
the entries x of an element from M8(G F(28)), i.e., γW (a) = b where bi j = SW [ai j ] for all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 7 (see [13,
Section 13.1.3] for the definition of SW ). The function piW : M8(G F(28)) → M8(G F(28)) is defined as a cyclical
shift of column j downwards by j byte positions, i.e., piW (a) is the matrix b defined as bi j = a(i− j) mod 8, j for all 0 ≤
i, j ≤ 7. For any (c0, c1, . . . , cn−1) ∈ G F(28)n let cir(c0, c1, . . . , cn−1) denote the circulant matrix c˜ ∈ Mn(G F(28))
defined by c˜i j = c j−i mod n for all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1. The linear diffusion layer θW : M8(G F(28))→ M8(G F(28)) is
defined as θW (a) = a ·DW , where DW = cir(01x , 01x , 04x , 01x , 08x , 05x , 02x , 09x ). The entire encryption function
of the W block cipher W [K ] : M8(G F(28))→ M8(G F(28)) is defined as
W [K ] = (ρW [k10] ◦ · · · ◦ ρW [k1]) ◦ σ [k0],
where K is a 512-bit key and k0, k1, . . . , k10 ∈ M8(G F(28)) are the subkeys obtained from the W key schedule.
In the padding algorithm of WHIRLPOOL, every message x of bit length ` is padded first with a 1-bit, and then
with the least number of 0-bits which yield a bit string whose length is an odd multiple of 256, and then finally with
the 256-bit binary representation of `. WHIRLPOOL uses the Miyaguchi–Preneel scheme [19, 9.43] as compression
function, which is defined over t padded message blocks xi , 1 ≤ i ≤ t , as H0 = I V , and
Hi = W [Hi−1](xi )⊕ Hi−1 ⊕ xi
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t , where the initialization vector I V is the all-zero vector of {0, 1}512. The final message digest of
WHIRLPOOL for a message x is defined as the result Ht of the compression function. Let
GW = 〈 {ρW [k] : k ∈ M8(G F(28))} 〉,
denote the group generated by the round functions of the W block cipher used in the compression scheme of the
WHIRLPOOL hash function. Note that properties of the round subkeys of W caused by the key scheduling are neglected
here.
Theorem 6. The group GW is the alternating group on M8(G F(28)).
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Proof. As the W block cipher is a dual Rijndael-like cipher operating on the state space M8(G F(28)), the results
of Section 4 hold for the group GW . For the S-Box mapping SW defined in [13, Section 13.1.3], the function
fSW [30x , 2fx ] ◦ fSW [81x , 0ax ] on G F(28) has the cycle (00x , . . . , 8ex ) of prime number length p = 239. Thus
it follows by Proposition 4 that the group GW has property P . Let cW : {0, 1, . . . , 7} → {0, 1, . . . , 7} denote the
function that defines the cyclical shifts of state columns in the piW step of the W block cipher. By the definition of piW ,
we have 1 ∈ im(cW ). Let DW ∈ M8(G F(28)) denote the invertible matrix of the linear diffusion layer θW defined
above. The vector b = ( a8x , 56x , 02x , 9fx , c2x , 24x , c7x , 53x ) satisfies the property that for all non-zero matrices
δ ∈ ∆(8, 8), all entries of the vector b · δ · DW are non-zero. Then, by Theorem 4, it follows that GW is the alternating
group on the set M8(G F(28)). 
In the remainder of this section the impact of the preceding theorem for the security goals of WHIRLPOOL, like
preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance is discussed by considering possible attacks
on the underlying block cipher W applied in the compression scheme.
Preimage resistance. A hash function h : {0, 1}∗→ {0, 1}` is called preimage resistant if for any given output y of h,
it is not possible for an attacker to find an element x such that h(x) = y with less than about 2` work. With respect
to the WHIRLPOOL compression function, this requires that it is not possible for an attacker to find for a given pair
H, H ′ ∈ {0, 1}512 a message block x ∈ {0, 1}512 such that W [H ](x) ⊕ H ⊕ x = H ′ with less than about 2` work.
Let H, H ′ ∈ {0, 1}512 be given. Searching for a message x ∈ {0, 1}512 such that W [H ](x) ⊕ H ⊕ x = H ′ requires
the computation of W [H ] for about 2512 times. But if the group GW were intransitive, then we could at first check
whether some element x is in the same orbit as H ⊕ H ′⊕ x . If x is not in the same orbit as H ⊕ H ′⊕ x , then x can be
discarded and the expensive computation of W [H ](x) is not necessary. Hence, if there is an algorithm with negligible
time complexity for deciding the membership of an element x to an orbit, and if the message space is divided into
d > 1 orbits, the workload to find a preimage as described above, is about 2512/d. If the group GW were transitive but
imprimitive, then there is a complete non-trivial block system for GW . Suppose there is an algorithm that computes
for any element x the block X containing x with negligible time complexity. Then we could at first check whether the
block that contains the element x is mapped by W [H ] to a block that contains H ⊕ H ′ ⊕ x . Again, if this is not the
case, the element x can be discarded and the computation of W [H ](x) is not necessary. Thus, if we have a complete
non-trivial block system for GW consisting of t blocks, the workload of finding a preimage as described above, is
about 2512/t . In both cases, it might be possible to perform precomputations, in order to exclude large sets of variants
for x at the beginning of the search. Finally, for groups GW being isomorphic to some subgroup of the affine group
AGL(64, 28), it is possible to derive a simple criterion for finding a preimage x for given h(x).
Second-preimage resistance. A hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` is called second-preimage resistant if, for any
given output y = h(x) and element x , it is not possible for an attacker to find another input x ′ 6= x such that
h(x ′) = h(x) with less than about 2` work. Hence, for any given element x , the same attack possibilities as for the
preimage resistance arise.
Collision resistance. A hash function h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}` is called collision resistant if it is not possible for an
attacker to find two inputs x , x ′ with x ′ 6= x such that h(x ′) = h(x) with less than about 2`/2 work. Depending on the
structure of the orbits or the blocks, the search can be restricted to a subset of the message space in a way similar to
the one described for the preimage search, which leads to an expected workload of generating a collision of less than
the order of 2256 executions of WHIRLPOOL. If the “algebraic weakness” is related to some weakness with respect
to differential or linear cryptanalysis (e.g., to truncated differentials, as described in [4]), then differential or linear
approaches may simplify collision search.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we provided conditions for which the round functions of a Rijndael-like `-bit block cipher generate
the alternating group on the set {0, 1}`. As a consequence, we obtained the result that the round functions of the actual
Rijndael for all block sizes, as well as the round functions of the block cipher used by the compression function of
the WHIRLPOOL hash function [13] generate the alternating group on their message space. Our results demonstrate
further that the round functions of a large number of `-bit Rijndael-like ciphers generate the alternating group on the
set {0, 1}`. This indicates that there is no trapdoor design for a Rijndael-like cipher based on the imprimitivity of the
group action of its proper round functions which is difficult to detect.
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